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Abstract
The relationship between entrepreneurship and the efficiency of Justice is investigated under this 
thesis. Through an empirical analysis conducted in a sample of 37 European countries and with 
cross-sectional data referring to the year 2012, the research focuses on highlighting the impact the 
judicial efficiency has on the entrepreneurs’ expectations on the reliability of the national legal 
systems, with the thought that the latter acts as a factor which fosters entrepreneurial activity. The 
term judicial efficiency is used herein to denote the performance of the national legal systems 
especially with regard to contract enforcement which is considered a sine qua non condition for 
successful business transactions. The present thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature that 
focuses on studying the determinants of entrepreneurship. 
The dissertation is structured in 7 sections. First, the Introduction describes briefly the topic of the 
dissertation. Second, the relative literature review is developed. Data and their sources follow in 
section 3, while the methodology used is presented in the fourth section. Section 5 presents the 
findings of the empirical analysis and contains a discussion of the findings. Finally, the last session 
concludes, summarising the main findings and making some suggestions based on them. 
For this Thesis, I would like to express my foremost gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Theologos 
Dergiades for introducing me to the topic as well as for his useful comments, remarks, valuable 
guidance and engagement through the entire process of writing this master thesis. My sincere 
thanks also go to the academic, librarian and administrative staff of the International Hellenic 
University for their continuous assistance to my work. 
Maria Theologidou 
29/10/2016 
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1. Introduction
Entrepreneurship is generally regarded as the workhorse of the economic development and growth. 
Defined either as the outcome of managerial decisions or as the “new entry” activity of motivated 
self-employed individuals, it constitutes the core of innovation, business risk taking, productivity 
and job creation. Given its importance, entrepreneurship has largely attracted the interest of the 
recent literature which focuses on defining it and examining the determinants of it with the aim to 
formulate an appropriate policy contour for its promotion. Many institutional factors potentially 
affect the entrepreneurial activity in a given State including among others the availability of and 
access to credit, the liquidity constraints, education, business and entrepreneurial culture. 
Additionally, the existence of a stable and investment-friendly taxation regime, bankruptcy 
legislation and labor laws may significantly influence the entrepreneurial activity.  
 Except for the above mentioned factors, another one named judicial efficiency has also been 
proven to largely impact on entrepreneurship. Defined as the level of efficiency of the operation of 
the justice system, judicial efficiency constitutes an important institutional determinant of 
entrepreneurship and at the same time it reveals also the performance of the political regime in a 
given State, in the sense that both economical and political considerations may arise due to an 
inefficient justice system. Judicial efficiency may be measured with reference to a number of factors 
which indicatively extend to contract enforcement, productivity of the judges and the other inputs 
employed, the speed with which the judiciary disposes of the pending cases, the quality of justice 
offered and the level of protection of property rights.  
 Although the literature has separately investigated entrepreneurship and judicial efficiency 
to a large extent, the literature which examines the impact of the latter on the first is still very 
limited. The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to contribute to the investigation of the influence the 
judicial efficiency has on entrepreneurship. Having Ippoliti et al. (2014) paper titled “Judicial 
efficiency and entrepreneurs’ expectations on the reliability of the European legal systems” as a 
basis, the empirical analysis performed herein purports to update the results by using more recent 
data referring to the year 2012 and examine whether the relevant theory can be confirmed. The 
research is performed on a set of cross-sectional data of 37 European countries for the year 2012. 
The dependent variable is the “Enforcing Contract-Distance to Frontier” which is employed to 
account for entrepreneurship and it particularly shows the distance of each economy to the best 
performance observed on a number of indicators which relate to contract enforcement, across all 
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economies in the Doing Business sample since 2005. The independent variables include the 
Clearance Rate, the Civil Liberties, and Dummy variables which take into consideration the 
distinction of the legal systems into German, French, English, Socialist and Scandinavian origin 
legal systems, based on La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2003). For the estimation of the 
model, the classical linear regression model is employed with the use of the Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) approach. 
 The results of the empirical analysis are found to be in accordance with the theory which 
indicates a positive relationship between judicial efficiency and entrepreneurship. The coefficients 
of the Clearance Rate and Civil Liberties variables are positive, revealing their positive influence on 
the entrepreneurs’ expectations on the reliability of the legal systems particularly examined with 
regard to the enforcement of the contracts. Moreover, the Dummy variables are statistically 
significant and reveal an impact of the origin of the legal system on entrepreneurship with the 
English legal origin system, being the base category, to impact on it less than the German, French, 
Socialist and Scandinavian ones. Overall, the outcome of the empirical analysis suggests that the 
improvement of the efficiency with which the judiciary operates could be regarded as a policy 
measure towards creating a reliable institutional framework which in turn may potentially enhance 
the entrepreneurial activity and consequently contribute to the economic development and growth. 
The regression results indicate that a reliable and efficient national legal system may constitute a 
fertile ground capable of attracting the “new entry” business activity, which is considered to be at 
the core of  what is generally defined as entrepreneurship.  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2. Literature Review
2.1 Entrepreneurship: definition and importance for economic growth 
As Braunerhjelm et al. (2015) allege, entrepreneurship may be the outcome of decisions made by 
influential managers of organizations. However, it is the “new entry” activity and the creation of 
new business ventures which is at the core of what we define as entrepreneurship. The creation of a 
new enterprise, either in the form of a personal activity or in the form of a legal entity, requires the 
attractiveness of self-employment over employment within existing organizations of the public or 
private sector or over unemployment. The decision one makes to become a self-employed 
entrepreneur is heavily influenced by the existing institutions which impact both on the individual’s 
motivation and the uncertainty inherent in the corresponding decision-making process. The number 
of new businesses entering the market is an important indicator of the economy. New 
entrepreneurial activity fosters competition by adding pressure on the existing entities and, 
additionally, finances the market with new capital. According to Foster et al. (1998), approximately 
25% of the growth in productivity within the U.S. manufacturing sector stems from the replacement 
of old unproductive firms by new productive firms, a phenomenon which was named as “net entry 
effect”. Moreover, entrepreneurs, self-employed individuals who run their own firms, have been 
regarded as catalysts of the economic change and economic improvement mainly because of their 
capacity to innovate and their willingness to take business risks, as Armour and Cumming (2008) 
have pointed out.  
A distinction between Opportunity-Motivated (OME) and Necessity-Motivated (NME) 
entrepreneurial activity was made by McMullen et al. (2008) when they studied the relationship 
between entrepreneurship and institutional activity. This distinction is not new. Previous literature 
has used different terminology to refer to what the Institutional Theory distinguishes as opportunity-
driven and necessity-driven entrepreneurs. For instance, Schumpeter (1934) used the terms 
innovators versus imitators, Baumol (1990), Baumol and Strom (2007) and Minniti (2008) referred 
to productive and unproductive entrepreneurship, Autio and Acs (2010) distinguished between 
entrepreneurs with growth aspirations and entrepreneurs without them, and, finally, Dau and 
Cuerzo-Cazurra (2014) talked about formal and informal entrepreneurship. What is important is 
that, independently of the terminology used, the difference among the two types of entrepreneurship 
lies mainly on the motives which drive individuals to become self-employed. Consequently, in 
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OME entrepreneurs are “pulled” by the attractiveness of a business opportunity, while to NME they 
resort due to absence of employment alternatives or unsatisfactory, in terms of income-generation, 
alternatives.   
McMullen et al. (2008) highlight the importance of this distinction on their relative research. 
Although they find a significant relationship between entrepreneurship and institutional activity in 
general, they note that differences in the relationship between the two variables were found, which 
are attributable on the one hand on the type of entrepreneurial activity, whether OME or NME, and, 
on the other hand, on the various dimensions of economic freedom such as fiscal freedom, 
monetary freedom, and labor freedom. Within this context, fiscal and monetary freedoms were 
found to relate only to NME, while labor freedom was found related to both OME and NME. The 
researchers justify the difference by invoking the different profit margins related to OME and NME, 
in the sense that fewer profits are expected from the imitative activity of the NME compared to the 
innovative action of an OME, which is thought to earn more through creating niche markets. 
Differences arise due to different motives; OME are self-determined while NME is determined by 
the external environment. Again, the differences in the profit margins result from the differences in 
the motivation for the one or the other type of entrepreneurial activity. Finally, OME was found to 
be more affected by the level of property rights’ protection than NME. Strong property rights act as 
an incentive for entrepreneurial activity based on innovation. Therefore, as law enforcement with 
regard to property rights increases, OME increases too. 
Finally, an uncontested relationship exists between entrepreneurship on the one hand and 
economic development and growth on the other hand. Indeed, entrepreneurship enhances 
productivity, reinforces employment through the creation of new jobs and, finally, increases 
governmental income through the imposition of taxes on business income and profits. Braunerhjelm 
et al. (2015) emphasized on the positive effects of entrepreneurship on job creation, wealth and 
income generation, innovation and competition within industries, and developed some fundamental 
considerations regarding the relationship between regulation, firm dynamic and entrepreneurship. In 
fact, the contribution of entrepreneurship on economic development and growth has become more 
apparent since the economic crisis and following recession which revealed public policy makers’ 
coordinated efforts to promote entrepreneurship as a means to ameliorate the economic situation. 
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2.2 Judicial efficiency: definition and key determinants 
The importance of judicial efficiency for economic development and growth has been amply 
documented by the literature. Judicial efficiency is a term widely used to denote the efficiency in 
the operation of the judicial system in a given State. Several determinant factors define the 
efficiency of the judiciary and have been largely reported in the literature. Garcia-Posada et al. 
(2014) regard judicial efficiency as the ability of the legal system to enforce the contractual 
obligations undertaken by the contracting parties. Judicial efficiency is, thus, influenced by factors 
such as the speed with which tribunals render their decisions and the level of education and relevant 
training of the judges. Japelli et al. (2002) highlight specifically the cost of enforcing contracts as 
being the key determinant of judicial efficiency. To this regard, two main indicators need to be taken 
into consideration for the judicial efficiency to be assessed; first, the time-length of ordinary civil 
trials, which is directly linked to the cost of court proceedings, and, second, the ratio of the number 
of civil suits pending before the courts over the population. 
Moreover, efficiency in justice is defined by Voigt (2016) as the abstention of unreasonable 
delays and overly long case backlogs. Indeed, potential judicial, political and economic 
considerations might arise due to significant court delays. In fact, unreasonable delays in the 
rendering of justice may go as deep as to threaten apart from a country’s justice system, its political 
regime as well. Moreover, economic consequences relating to the decrease in the number of 
business contracts signed may occur, which in the long term unavoidably affect employment, 
growth and income. Last but not least, the infringement of core human rights, such as the right to 
personal freedom, might be the outcome of long waiting times with regard to the court process. As 
Voigt (2016) explains, the speed of justice and consequently its efficiency are influenced among 
others by the existing substantive law in a given country, the relative procedural law and the degree 
of the judicial organization. Indeed, unclear or inconsistent legislation slows down the rendering of 
the judicial decisions while the number of specialized courts (i.e. constitutional courts) and the 
possibility of the substitution of judges by other judicial staff are likely to affect the time needed for 
the trials to be completed.  
Furthermore, Voigt (2016) uses the productivity function in order to define judicial 
efficiency; efficiency, therefore, exists either when a specific outcome is achieved with minimum 
use of inputs or when maximization of the output is achieved exclusively with given inputs. In order 
to evaluate judicial efficiency, measured under the productivity function, and the relevant 
performance of the courts in a given country, one should consider both supply and demand 
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determinants. Indicatively, supply side considerations include the number of judges per capita, with 
judges’ education, age and experience offering further insights, the incentives which the judges are 
given, examined both in terms of wages and in terms of career prospects, the number and the 
quality of the rest of the judicial staff which assists the judges’ tasks, and, the available technology 
extending to the software used, the exchange of information between judges and between judges 
and police and other public servants. In addition, the complexity of the judicial system, the amount 
of the state budget allocated to justice and the complexity of the filed cases are also to be 
considered. With regard to the demand side considerations, these refer indicatively to the 
availability of the Alternative Dispute Resolution and other court substitutes, the direct and indirect 
costs of the access to justice, the attitude towards litigation in general, the quality of substantive and 
procedural law and precedents, citizens’ customs and litigants’ risk aversion.  
Although speed is an important element, judicial efficiency should by no means be regarded 
only from this side; the quality of justice is of equal importance. There is, actually, as Voigt (2016) 
supports, an interaction between speed and quality which affects both the private and the public 
good that is expected to result from a judicial decision. The litigants to a trial are expected to be 
interested in both the speed of the court’s decision making and its quality, especially when quality is 
seen as access to a fair trial. Similarly, precedent is important as it decreases the number of 
subsequent cases similar to those for which a decision has been rendered through the interpretation 
of the law.  To this regard, speed and quality both matter; slow decision making can lead to 
submission of similar cases before the court which could have been avoided had the court more 
quickly provided its decision on the similar case pending before it. After all, when it comes to 
efficiency in justice, what matters is to find the right balance between speed and quality. 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) also point out the quality of the judiciary and its contribution to the 
efficiency of justice. To them, quality is based on the one hand, on the de jure laws and regulations 
and, on the other hand, on the de facto implementation of these laws and regulations. In their 
research, they employ a number of key factors to measure the quality of the judicial system in the 
Mexico states. These key factors include, first, the institutional quality which is determined by the 
quality of the judges, the expertise and specialization of judges in commercial cases, the impartiality 
of judges and the criteria for their promotion and, second, the duration of the cases which refers to 
the average time it takes to resolve a case and enforce a contract as well as to the backlog of 
pending cases. The quantity and efficiency in the use of the human and physical resources allocated 
to the judiciary and the support that the executive authorities provide with regard to the enforcement 
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of the final verdicts of the courts are also taken into account in order to assess justice quality. 
Finally, Laeven et al. (2005) associate the performance of the judicial system to the transparency 
and efficiency of the courts which they evaluate with data collected to account for the degree of 
property rights’ protection and the compliance with the legal provisions within a large number of 
countries. Consequently, property rights’ protection and compliance constitute additional key 
determinants of judicial efficiency. 
2.3 The impact of institutions on entrepreneurship 
A large literature has highlighted several crucial institutional factors which can potentially affect 
entrepreneurship. Such determinants include among others the availability of and access to credit, 
possible liquidity constraints, education, business and entrepreneurial culture. In addition, the 
regulatory environment, mainly with respect to the existence of a stable and investment-friendly 
taxation regime, bankruptcy legislation and labor laws, has been observed to influence the 
entrepreneurial activity. To all the above, judicial efficiency, examined in terms of the ability of the 
legal system to enforce the contractual obligations of the parties should be added as well. 
While Verheul et al. (2002) and Veciana (1999) support that not only institutional but also 
economic, psychological and organizational factors determine entrepreneurship, the Institutional 
theory emphasizes on the institutional environment, which it considers decisive for both the 
individuals’ decision to become entrepreneurs and for the characteristics of the new business 
ventures which subsequently affect growth rates in a given country. According to this theory, all 
actions of a firm are tightly linked to and influenced by the domestic institutional environment. This 
environment is determined by a number of factors that among others include the existence of laws 
and regulations which constitute the normative dimension of the regulatory environment. The 
normative regulatory component more specifically refers to government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, control of corruption, contract enforcement, tax burden, and some administrative and 
physical international trade barriers. In the same direction, North (1990) defined institutions as the 
rules which regulate the political, social and economic relationships in a society. These rules include 
property rights, business freedom, fiscal freedom, labor freedom, financial capital and educational 
capital. A further taxonomy distinguishes between formal and informal institutions; the first are 
related to the political, legal and economic rules which regulate individual behavior and facilitate 
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business transactions, while the second mostly refer to the values and beliefs which characterize a 
given society (North 1990).  
McMullen et al. (2008), studied the relationship between entrepreneurship and institutional 
activity. Investigating a number of assumptions concerning the relationship of entrepreneurship and 
governmental-based variables, they came to the conclusion that there is a strong link between self-
employment and transaction costs, whereby the role of institutions is crucial in terms of ensuring a 
standard of economic freedom. In turn, economic freedom is provided through the incentives 
offered in the form of low taxation, independent legal system and property rights’ protection. 
Entrepreneurial activity is, thus, largely dependent on the level of economic freedom. Low 
governmental intervention fosters economic freedom which in turn increases entrepreneurial action. 
Moreover, internalization can largely contribute to the growth of firms in general, but most 
importantly to that of small enterprises. To this regard, institutional weakness constitutes an 
impediment towards the creation of competitive advantage for firms, an effect which can be 
particularly observed in periods of stagnation and economic recession. Accordingly, Novikov 
(2014) investigated the impact of the institutional environment, with emphasis on its regulatory 
dimension on the export activity, as the most frequent way of internationalization (APEC SMEWG 
2011; European Commission 2010) of small enterprises and found that small enterprises are more 
vulnerable in negative institutional changes. These findings were used to suggest governments the 
enhancement of policies which impact on the private sector’s development and the fostering of the 
efficiency of the judicial system with the aim to ensure contract enforcement.   
Furthermore, according to Peng et al. (2009), the institutional frameworks constitute a 
crucial determinant of the economic behavior and development of a region or a nation. Similarly, 
Aidis (2005) alleged that the institutional context is inextricably linked to the perceptions of 
uncertainty and risk which, in turn, drive entrepreneurial decisions. Based on the above, Dies-
Martin et al. (2016) ascribed the differences in the rates of entrepreneurial activity across countries 
in the different institutional frameworks and invoked the Institutional theory and its several tenets to 
claim that it is the legitimacy which arises within a given institutional framework which ultimately 
determines the levels of uncertainty and, consequently, individuals’ willingness to take on business 
risks. For this purpose, the researchers developed a model to investigate the impact of legitimacy on 
both entrepreneurial activity and access to financing collectively. Based on Suchman’s (1995) 
definition, they defined entrepreneurial legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that 
the actions of a country to promote entrepreneurial activity are desirable, proper, or appropriate”. 
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Among the factors that according to the entrepreneurs’  perception affect legitimacy, the writers 
explore culture, norms, values and the judicial system as well as tradition and the business 
incentives and they classify them in three types of legitimacy; regulative, normative and cognitive. 
Regulative legitimacy is comprised by the rules, policies and laws which regulate individuals’ 
behavior and acts and it affects entrepreneurial activity by imposing a kind of “code of conduct” 
which entrepreneurs are obliged to follow. Dies-Martin et al. (2016) research concludes among 
others that in innovation-driven countries there is a link between regulative entrepreneurial 
legitimacy and access to financial resources. This result points out that a favorable regulation 
regime in place is a sine qua non condition for a country to attract investors. 
The level of governmental intervention has also been studied towards entrepreneurial levels 
and rates of economic growth. It has been proven that heavily regulated economies are likely to 
discourage entrepreneurial activity while low regulation can lead to high levels of corruption, again 
creating aversion towards entrepreneurship. Accordingly, El-Namaki (1998) suggests that countries 
with less regulation, low barriers to entry and open markets are more likely to offer more business 
opportunities and attract higher rates of entrepreneurship. Moreover, according to Manalova et al. 
(2008), the countries which incentivize individuals to start new business usually are characterized 
by stable and trustworthy taxation systems or tax incentives, coherent and predictable application of 
the law and, finally, low levels of bureaucracy. Ayyagari et al. (2007) proved that the less costly it is 
to start a new business, the larger the number of small business is observed, while Alesina et al. 
(2005) suggested that there is a strong, negative impact of the regulation of markets on investment 
and, therefore, growth. Finally, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Nicoletti et al. (2001a, 2001b), 
Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), Pissarides (2001), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), Djankon et al. 
(2002), all support the view that there is a negative impact of excessive regulation on 
entrepreneurship by focusing on comparisons between developing and developed economies. 
The existence of a certain regulatory level is indispensable for transparent and efficient 
markets. To this regard, the protection and enforcement of property rights is being emphasized. 
However, overregulation may have undesirable results, acting as a hindering factor towards 
innovation and productivity growth. Excessive regulation may negatively affect the size of startups 
and consequently reduce the success probability as firms are forced to enter to and compete in 
markets while being too small. In this direction, Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) provide further 
evidence which show that excessive entry regulation decreases the entry of new varieties or goods 
in industries preventing them from catching up with constantly expanding global demand or the 
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new opportunities opened up by technological advances. All these deter general economic growth. 
Therefore, a conclusion can be reached towards the need to find the right balance between an 
institutional environment able to attract new entries and create growth and over-regulation which 
can harm market efficiency, innovation and productivity growth (Acemoglu et al. 2003, 2006; Chun 
et al. 2007). 
Finally, entrepreneurial growth aspirations are affected by institutions; they benefit from the 
presence of strong government particularly translated as property rights’ enforcement as well as by 
less governmental intervention. Estrin et al. (2013) examine how the different types of institutions 
affect the high-growth aspirations of new entrepreneurs. Based on William’s (2000) concept of the 
hierarchy of institutions, they classify institutions based on three fundamental aspects; 1) level of 
corruption, 2) property rights’ strength and 3) the extent of governmental activity. They then 
develop a number of hypotheses with regard to how these different institutional aspects affect 
entrepreneurial aspirations while at the end, they also consider the impact of social structures on 
alleviating the negative impact of institutions on entrepreneurship based on the social micro-level 
perspective of Granovetter (1985).  
Different institutions affect different types of entrepreneurship. The researchers focus their 
attention on examining these institutions which impact the creation of new ventures with future 
considerable growth plans in contrast to self-employment and small firms, believing that the 
potential of the latter is significant for the achievement of economic growth and employment 
creation. (Acs, 2006; Autio and Acs, 2010; Hessels et al., 2008; Minniti and Lévesque, 2010). 
Imparting form Autio (2011:251), the writers assume high growth aspiration entrepreneurship as the 
type of entrepreneurial activity that mostly contributes to the creation of new jobs and thus attracts 
the interest of policy makers. They also find that strong local social ties can moderate the 
ineffectiveness of the macro-level institutions such as property rights and corruption, it cannot, 
however, be claimed that they eliminate it. The role of macro-level institutions remains the key 
determinant of entrepreneurial growth aspirations. 
2.4 Taxation, corruption and entrepreneurship 
Taxation and corruption have been observed to significantly affect entrepreneurship. The impact of 
taxation on entrepreneurship has long been investigated and reported in the literature. For example, 
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Da Rin et al. (2011) investigated how the tax policy impacts on the creation of new business to find 
a negative impact of corporate income taxation on the number of new entries. In general, high levels 
of taxation (Gordon, 1998; Glaeser and Kerr, 2009 as well as complex regulatory tax structures 
(Braunerhjelm and Eklund, 2014) constitute considerable entry barriers as they increase startup 
costs and hamper new entrepreneurial activity. Moreover, tax evasion and corruption are interrelated 
and both negatively impact on entrepreneurship. High levels of corruption create a tax evasion 
friendly environment which becomes noticeable in the form of a shadow economy, while at the 
same time a tax evasion environment may lead tax administrators to corruption. The general view 
shows an aversion towards both corruption and tax evasion, as it recognizes the negative impact 
they have on the economy and notably on entrepreneurship.  
Additionally, Dove (2015) shows how judicial independence is an important determinant of 
entrepreneurship especially when seen under its ability to act in the direction of reducing 
corruption. The research focuses on the long-term relationship between entrepreneurship and, 
jointly, tax evasion and corruption in 15 European countries between 2002 and 2010. Distinguishing 
between opportunity and necessity driven entrepreneurship, the researchers find out less impact of 
tax evasion and corruption on necessity driven entrepreneurship which is explained by the 
motivations lying behind it. In NME, the individual resorts as a last resort, when no other 
possibilities of employment exist. Therefore, this category of entrepreneurs is less sensitive to 
institutional weaknesses. Although corruption influences Necessity Motivate Entrepreneurship 
(NME) in a smaller degree when compared to its impact on Total Entrepreneurship, tax evasion is 
totally indifferent when it comes to necessity driven entrepreneurs. The writers conclude that 
governments should focus on the elimination or at least reduction of the institutional weakness in 
order to foster economic growth through entrepreneurial activity. 
Finally, Estrin et al. 2013 regard corruption as an additional, though informal, institution 
which highly impacts on entrepreneurship, while Anokhin and Schulze (2009) view it as a form of 
taxation, in the sense that it discourages economic activities especially for high growth aspiration 
entrepreneurs who bear the transaction costs of a corrupted environment. In order to survive within 
a corrupted economic environment, entrepreneurs will have to adapt to the informal corruption 
environment but until so they will act entrepreneurial activity at a disadvantage. The empirical 
investigation of the researchers robustly shows that weak property rights and corruption negatively 
impact on employment growth aspirations. 
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2.5 Judicial efficiency and the cost of credit 
Financing is crucial for the function of businesses. The lack of access to capital is one of the main 
problems that entrepreneurs face, especially when they have to establish a new business from 
scratch and it is observed in several countries whether they belong to the developed or the 
developing economies. Several studies have shown that the availability and cost of credit is highly 
influenced by the efficiency of the judiciary. Hence, the examination of the relationship between 
judicial efficiency and the cost of credit is important given its indirect impact on the entrepreneurial 
activity. Japelli et al. (2002), studied the relationship that exists between judicial efficiency and 
credit market performance and concluded that there is indeed a relationship between judicial 
efficiency and the availability and cost of credit. As judicial efficiency improves, aggregate lending 
increases while the collateral demanded reduces. In addition, it was found that judicial efficiency is 
positively correlated with the amount of lending, while negatively correlated with the proxies which 
were used to account for credit rationing.  
In particular, the researchers used panel data from the Italian National Institute of Statistics 
(ISTAT) referring to 95 Italian Provinces and for the time period between 1984 and 1998 in order to 
statistically show that improvements on the judiciary can lead to a reduction on credit rationing and 
an increase on the volume of lending. Making a distinction between a borrower’s accidental and 
strategic default on a loan, they focused their attention on the case of strategic default where the 
borrower, even if potentially solvent, is unwilling to pay back the loan that has been granted to him. 
Why this happens is a consequence of weighting the gain from a potential default on the loan 
obligation towards the perceived costs which are expected to result from the presumed sanctions 
imposed for non-performance. A borrower, thus, defaults strategically, when he assumes a lower 
default cost when compared to that of the presumed sanctions. Moreover, the cost of the sanctions is 
highly dependent on the law and the level of its enforcement. To this extent, it becomes apparent 
that poor judicial efficiency enhances the opportunistic behavior of debtors who tend to take 
advantage of the creditors’ difficulty to enforce their claims mainly due to costly and slow court 
proceedings. To defend themselves against such opportunistic behaviors, lenders tend to reduce the 
availability of credit, influencing this way the performance of the credit market. 
Furthermore, Bae and Goyal (2003) revealed that property rights and the level of their 
protection within a certain country work towards the direction of lowering loan interest rates for 
increased levels of protection. Additionally, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) found that institutions in 
general, which among others include courts, are in the position to affect the cost of lending in the 
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sense that banks will charge less for credit in those countries where better institutions exist. Finally, 
Laeven et al. (2005), also investigated the relationship which exists between judicial efficiency and 
the cost of bank credit across many countries for the year 2000. In their research, the cost of bank 
credit was measured as the spread between the average lending interest rate and the average cost of 
funding through deposit interest payments. The results revealed a statistically and economically 
significant impact judicial efficiency and the debt contracts’ enforcement have on bank interest rates 
spreads. Taking into consideration certain country specific characteristics which can potentially 
influence the results of the research such as the level of economic development, this paper indicates 
judicial efficiency and inflation rates as the two main determinants of the banks’ lending interest 
spreads. Adding on the previous research, it reveals that judicial reform can lead to lower cost of 
credit for both households and firms and yet even more it may increase the amount of lending for 
the existing, rationed customers.  On a broader scope, judicial reform enhances the investment 
climate in general, as banks are more keen to increase the amount of credit and reduce its cost when 
they can recover loans and repossess collateral relatively fast in cases of default. 
2.6 Judicial efficiency and entrepreneurship 
A more recent literature has concentrated on studying in particular the impact of judicial efficiency 
on entrepreneurship, considering it as one of the most influential institutions with regard to the 
enhancement of entrepreneurial activity. In fact, the importance of the quality of the judicial system 
for the economic development has been amply documented by empirical literature. For example, it 
has been shown that judicial efficiency influences the development of financial and credit markets 
(Djakov et al. 2008), the availability and the relevant cost of borrowing money (Bae and Goyal, 
2009), the volume of trade activity (Berkowitz et al. 2006), specialization at work (Nunn, 2007) 
and, finally, competition (Johnson et al. 2002). Judicial efficiency may affect a number of firm 
choices including, but not limited to, investments, employment, models of organizational structure 
and the contractual relationships with potential counterparts; all these factors affecting eventually 
firm size. Lack of judicial efficiency negatively affects firms’ growth but it does not hinder firm’s 
entry. Lengthy trials hinder contract enforcement which eventually increases entrepreneurs’ risk 
concern and reduces their willingness to invest; hence, growth opportunities diminish. 
Garcia-Posada et al. (2014), investigated how the design and the efficacy of the judicial 
system can influence the entry rate of entrepreneurs, given that this entry rate largely forms 
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entrepreneurship. They concentrated on Spain, a country with very low entry rates by international 
standards and a judicial system which performs worse compared to the European average. The 
research concentrated on civil cases, measuring the degree of enforcement of the contractual 
obligations of the parties. More specifically, judicial efficacy was measured through the 
construction of a congestion rate variable, defined as the ratio of the sum of pending plus new cases 
in a year over the cases resolved in the same year. The finding was that improvement of the efficacy 
of the courts in Spain, promoted the entry of new entrepreneurs in the Spanish market. However, no 
impact was observed on the exit rate, which was defined as the number of businesses which seize 
operations and liquidate their assets. Finally, it is noteworthy that the impact of judicial efficiency 
on entrepreneurship was statically confirmed only with regard to individual entrepreneurs and not 
with regard to corporations. As the writers explain, this fact is mainly attributed to the higher costs 
an individual is likely to face when referring a dispute to court in contrast to the lower costs 
incurred for corporations which assign their conflicts to their legal departments or in-house 
counsels. 
Moreover, Giacomelli and Menon (2012) examined the causal relationship between judicial 
efficiency and the size of firms across several municipalities of Italy believing that an efficient and 
well-performing judicial system is key to contract enforcement and property rights’ protection. 
Italian firms are characterized by a small size in general and this is considered to be a weakness of 
the productive system in place. It ultimately results in low productivity growth in Italy. This is 
mainly attributable, according to Banca d’Italia 2009 report, to the difficulties that small firms face 
when it comes to innovating and competing within the international context. Moreover, judicial 
efficiency in Italy appears to be very low, especially when compared to other European countries. 
According to the World Bank’s “Doing Business” report, Italy is ranked 157 out of 183 countries 
with regard to the “enforcing contracts” indicator, a result which arises mainly due to the extremely 
lengthy court proceedings. The researchers found that less efficient municipal judicial systems lead, 
on average, to smaller firm sizes. The results show that a 50% reduction of the length of the 
proceedings before civil courts can lead on average to an 8-12% increase in the size of firms, ceteris 
paribus.  
Similarly, Esposito et al. 2014 put up the inefficient judicial system in Italy as the cause 
behind the difficult business environment the country experiences. The inefficiency is depicted in 
the long delays in court proceedings and the enormous backlog of pending civil and commercial 
cases. It is undeniable that the improvement of the judicial system can positively affect the economy 
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by creating a more favorable business climate, fostering innovation and securing tax revenues. The 
writers insist on the positive effect of entrepreneurship on economic growth which could be 
achieved through the improvement of the judicial system. In this regard, they highlight as most 
important issues to be dealt with the court fees, the new mediation scheme which needs 
improvement, the strengthening of court management and finally, a thorough review of the appeal 
system. 
In 2002, a judicial reform was implemented by the government of Pakistan. Entitled 
“Access to Justice Programme” and conducted by the Asian Development Bank, the reform aimed 
primarily at reducing the backlog of 1.2 million cases pending before Pakistani Courts at that time. 
It was realized through the provision of more training on case-flow management to judges and it 
resulted in an increase in the rate of new firms in Pakistan. Pakistani GDP increased by 0,5% thanks 
to this reform, which cost the Pakistani Government $350 million or only 0,1% of the country’s 
2002 GDP. Besides entry regulations which are responsible for the entry rates of new firms, the 
judicial system is considered by entrepreneurs to be an important factor for consideration before 
deciding to become self-employed and it is most of the times the main obstacle that hinders 
entrepreneurial action. Chemin (2008) used the data of Pakistan’s judicial reform to investigate 
what motivates people to become entrepreneurs and how does the judiciary affect entrepreneurship. 
According to him, the judiciary may affect entrepreneurship through two ways; first, through the 
protection of property rights and, second, through credit markets. Securing property rights and 
contract enforcement constitute, therefore, the two main determinants of investments and 
accordingly entrepreneurship; and it is at the interest of and a responsibility of governments to 
provide these two through an efficient and timely judicial system. In detail, the reform’s results 
were the following; 1) Thanks to the judicial reform law and order issues ceased preventing the 
workforce from working and creating a favorable business environment, 2) The unemployed 
population became more confident with regard to obtaining credit and therefore, more willing to 
begin a self-employed activity. Consequently, the number of unemployed who started seeking for 
land or buildings etc to start a new business tripled after this reform took place. One third increase 
in the transitions from unemployed to self-employed or employed to self-employed were observed. 
Furthermore, lack of judicial efficiency and most importantly lack of implementation of the 
law has as a direct consequence the considerable increase of the transaction costs. Very high 
transaction costs, in turn, deteriorate market transactions and discourage firm entry, ultimately 
inhibiting economic growth through hindering competition and trade. Acemoglu et al. (2005) 
 15
pointed out the importance of institutions such as the judiciary in designating economic growth on 
the long term. Increasing firm size by augmenting production and labor is the main mechanism for 
firms to grow. This is mainly achieved through competition which creates the necessary dynamics 
for taking on capital and expanding. Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) alleged that 
such dynamics contribute to the aggregate growth of productivity in free markets. According to 
Laeven and Woodruff’s 2007, the quality of the legal system affects directly the investment risk 
and, hence, the willingness of entrepreneurs to invest and indirectly firm size. More specifically, 
their model suggests that improvements in the quality of justice increases the entrepreneurs’ 
demand for capital and labor. This increase in demand causes wage and rental rates to rise and 
consequently forces entrepreneurs with low ability to leave self-employment and search for a wage 
job position in existing firms. Hence, average firm size increases. Dougherty (2014) examined the 
impact the legal systems have on firm size in the large developing economy of Mexico. What is 
characteristic, is that quality and enforcement differences exist with regard to the legal system 
among the different States of Mexico. Additionally, the process of judicial reform also varies among 
these States. The researchers found that in States with higher judicial efficiency levels, the size of 
the firms appeared to be larger than in the States with lower quality of justice. The model concluded 
that the more the quality of the judiciary increased, the more the average firm size increased in 
Mexico. Finally, the researchers found evidence which support their hypothesis that judicial 
efficiency may be more pivotal in capital intensive industries, such as those of the manufacturing 
sector, where hold-up costs are more substantial. More specifically, the evidence showed that a 
movement form worst to best-practice judicial quality can boost average firm size by two-thirds and 
also lead to an increase of 8% in the GDP of the weakest States. 
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3. Data & Sources
The data employed to account for entrepreneurship are extracted from the 2010 World Bank’s 
“Doing Business” Report. The index employed is the variable labelled as “Enforcing Contract - 
Distance to Frontier”. This variable shows the distance of each economy to the best performance 
observed on a number of indicators which relate to contract enforcement, across all economies in 
the Doing Business sample since 2005. These indicators include: 1) the time it takes to enforce a 
contract (measured in days), 2) the cost of enforcing contracts (calculated as a % of the claim) and, 
3) the quality of the judicial processes index (with values ranging from 0 to 18). The “distance to 
frontier” is reflected on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the lowest performance and 100 
represents the “frontier”, hence the best performance. It is worth noting that this index measures 
only the subjective perceptions on the ease of contract enforcement in every country and it does not 
constitute an objective measurement of the judicial activity. Finally, it was considered as the most 
appropriate for capturing entrepreneurial levels as the overall level of entrepreneurship is ultimately 
affected by entrepreneurs’ expectations on the reliability of the judicial system captured by this 
index. 
 The Clearance Rate index is employed to measure judicial performance particularly with 
regard to the ability of the Judiciary to manage the load of cases. The relative data are extracted 
from the 2014 CEPEJ Report on "European judicial systems: efficiency and quality of justice”. The 
Clearance Rate (CR), expressed as a percentage, is given by the ratio of the cases disposed to the 
incoming ones as following: 
A CR = 100% indicates that all the lawsuits filed are dealt with by the Judiciary. Accordingly, a CR 
> 100% means that the judicial system is able to satisfy all the lawsuits filed plus some backlog 
cases as well, while a CR < 100% implies the inability to handle the incoming cases, which 
ultimately leads to a rise in the stock of backlog cases. 
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Clearance(Rate(%(=( Disposed(cases(in(a(periodIncoming(cases(in(a(period ×100
 The Civil Liberties index is used as a proxy of the civil rights enjoyed by the citizens in the 
countries examined herein and it generally accounts for the state of democracy in these countries. 
The Civil Liberties (CL) variable receives values from 0 to 10 and it is considered necessary in 
order to capture potential cases of judicial inefficiency attributable to scarcely democratic regimes. 
The relevant data are extracted from the 2012 Democracy Index Report issued by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit. Moreover, the distinction of the legal systems into English, Scandinavian, 
Socialist, German and French legal systems was considered necessary in order to capture potential 
differences in judicial performance which might be attributable to the difference in the regulatory 
regime of these legal systems. For this, reference has been made to La Porta et al. (1998) and 
Djankov et al. (2003). Finally, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (in constant 2011 
international $) and the Population (POP) indices which were employed as socio-economic 
variables in this study have been extracted from The World Bank’s DataBank.  
 Tables 1 and 2 below present, respectively, the descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
independent variables adopted in the regression analysis and the correlation matrix of the same 
variables. 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables
EC CR CL GDP POP
Mean 65,74 101,03 8,25 25.671,13 18.760.105,00
Median 68,00 100,40 8,82 23.722,34 7.199.077,00
Maximum 81,55 115,70 10,00 63.620,04 143.000.000,00
Minimum 42,38 65,40 4,12 4.150,51 421.364,00
Std. Dev. 9,81 8,75 1,54 14.230,02 30.237.815,00
Skewness -0,49 -1,61 -1,27 0,66 2,51
Kurtosis 2,33 8,82 3,88 2,92 9,40
Jarque-Bera 2,14 68,10 11,21 2,69 102,05
Probability 0,34 0,00 0,00 0,26 0,00
Sum 2.432,20 3.738,00 305,32 949.831,80 694.000.000,00
Sum Sq. Dev. 3.463,01 2.754,83 85,63 7.29E+09 3.29E+16
Observations 37 37 37 37 37
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The Correlation Matrix, as depicted in Table 2 above, is used to investigate the dependence between 
the multiple variables at the same time. The table contains the correlation coefficients between each 
one of the variables and the others. What we observe from the correlation matrix is that there is a 
weak negative correlation between the CR and CL variables. There is a moderate positive 
correlation between the CL variable and the GDP and moderate negative correlation between the CL 
and the POP variables. Finally, the EC variable has a weak positive correlation with each one of the 
independent variables. The absence of strong positive or negative correlation between any of the 
variables and the others indicates the absence of multicollinearity, namely the existence of an exact 
lineal relationship between the variables of the regression model.  
Table 2 Correlation Matrix
CL CR EC GDP POP
CL 1,00 -0,23 0,13 0,62 -0,43
CR -0,23 1,00 0,12 -0,12 0,11
EC 0,13 0,12 1,00 0,39 0,16
GDP 0,62 -0,12 0,39 1,00 0,08
POP -0,43 0,11 0,16 0,08 1,00
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4. Methodology
For the purposes of this empirical analysis we use the classical linear regression model. The 
specification adopted for the linear function has the following form:  
    
  ! !    (1)  
where, ! is the dependent variable, labelled as “Enforcing Contracts - Distance to Frontier”. This 
variable shows the distance of each economy to the best performance observed on a number of 
indicators which relate to contract enforcement, across all economies in the Doing Business sample 
since 2005 and receives values from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the lowest performance and 100 
represents the “frontier”, !  is the constant term, !  is the Clearance Rate variable taking values = 
100% when the court disposes all the incoming cases, < 100% when the court disposes less than the 
incoming cases and > 100% when the court disposes all the incoming cases plus some backlog 
cases. The !  variable is employed to depict the rate with which the Clearance rate affects the 
dependent variable. !  is the Civil Liberties variable with values from 0 to 10 and accordingly, 
!  is employed to account for the rate with which the Civil Liberties affect the EC variable. 
Finally, ! (with ! =1,2….,5) denotes the dummies which are used to distinguish the legal regimes 
into English, Scandinavian, Socialist, German and French, !  is the error term, and the ! ’s are the 
parameters to be estimated.    
 In order to estimate the parameters, we use the standard OLS approach which consists of 
minimizing the squared errors. To begin with, we set up the minimization problem in order to derive 
the formulas for the calculation of the intercept and the slope coefficient. The relative formula is, 
    !       (2) 
!  
ECi = c + β1CRi + β2CRi2 + β3CLi + β4CLi2 + cjDi, j + ε i
j=1
5
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⌢
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min (yi − ⌢β0 − ⌢β1xi )2
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N
∑
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To solve the minimization problem, we set the partial derivatives of the above equation equal to 0; 
we take first the derivative with respect to ! and set it equal to 0 and second, the derivative with 
respect to ! and set it equal to 0. W is used to denote ! . This gives us the 
following equations, 
     !      (3) 
 and,  
    !     (4) 
First, we solve equation (3), with respect to ! . We start by getting rid of -2 and re-write the 
equation as ! . We rearrange accordingly and use the algebraic fact that 
! . What we get is,  
    !        (5) 
Next, we divide everything by N and we obtain the formula, 
     !         (6) 
Now, we need to solve equation (4) with regard to ! . To do so, we get rid of -2 as above and 
rearrange to !  . 
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∑
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We then substitute the result obtained from the calculation of the first equation for !  which gives 
us,   
    !      (7) 
Then, we distribute the sum to each of the terms of the equation to get,    
    !    (8) 
Again, we make use of the algebraic fact that !  and, accordingly, that  ! . 
We re-write Equation (8) by applying these properties and then solve for !  which gives us,  
    !        (9) 
Furthermore, using algebra we derive that !  and that 
! . 
 These two properties are now substituted into (9) and lead us to,  
    !       (10) 
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5. Estimation Results & Discussion
To estimate our results, we first ran a regression including within our independent variables macro 
data such as the population (POP) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) variables, as they appear on 
Tables 1 and 2 of the previous section. These two variables were found to be highly insignificant 
and were therefore omitted from the estimation model. We ran again the regression without the 
macro data. Table 3 below presents the final estimation output: 
Table 3 Final Estimation Output
Dependent Variable: EC
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/07/2016 Time: 13:03
Sample: 1 37
Included observations: 37
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 4,0000)
No d.f. adjustment for standard errors & covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -100,141 40,525 -2,471 0,020
CR 3,610 0,728 4,957 0,000
CR^2 -0,019 0,004 -4,845 0,000
CL 13,140 6,269 2,096 0,045
CL^2 1,637 0,724 2,262 0,032
FLO 9,165 4,301 2,131 0,042
GLO 19,506 2,097 9,300 0,000
SCLO 11,473 3,036 3,779 0,001
SOLO 13,242 4,021 3,293 0,003
R-squared 0,420 Mean dependent var 65,735
Adjusted R-squared 0,255 S.D. dependent var 9,808
S.E. of regression 8,467 Akaike info criterion 7,318
Sum squared resid 2007,526 Schwarz criterion 7,710
Log likelihood -126,385 Hannan-Quinn criter. 7,456
F-statistic 2,538 Durbin-Watson stat 2,494
Prob(F-statistic) 0,032 Wald-F statistic 63,008
Prob(Wald F-Statistic) 0,000
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Overall, the estimation results are in accordance with the theory and the hypothesis raised herein 
that the efficiency of the justice systems positively affects the economic and entrepreneurial activity 
by reducing the uncertainty that is relative to the contract enforcement and which can act as an 
inhibiting factor for many economic transactions. In other words a favourable institutional 
environment, form the side of the judicial institutions, fosters entrepreneurship. All the variables are 
significant at the 0,05 level of significance. 
 As said, the CR variable is employed to measure the national system’s ability to deal with 
the current demand of justice. Within this context, a CR > 1 shows that the national judicial system 
can fully satisfy the current demand and even deal with a number of backlog cases as well, while a 
CR < 1 implies the inability of the national judicial system to dispose of the cases pending before it. 
In accordance with the theory, the CR is found to affect positively the EC in the sense that the EC 
increases when the CR increases but with a decreasing rate. It should be noted that the Clearance 
rate is employed to measure judicial performance, however it is not a measure of the productivity of 
the justice system as it does not take into consideration any labour force or other inputs. Hence, the 
CR compares the judicial performance of the national systems only with regard to the cases 
disposed, neglecting the resources employed and therefore no conclusions can be reached with 
regard to how efficiently organised the national judicial systems are.  
 With regard to the CL variable, findings indicate that a positive relationship exists between 
it and the dependent variable EC. The results show that the EC increases with an increasing rate 
when the CL increases. The positive coefficient is consistent with the idea that more advanced legal 
systems exist in the countries where civil rights enjoy higher protection and that higher levels of 
contract enforcement are expected to be found in such advanced legal systems. The positive 
coefficient is also in accordance with that part of the literature which links the effectiveness of the 
legal enforcement to the level of political and cultural development of societies (Djankov et al.). 
Also, according to La Porta et al. (1998), the level of civil rights enjoyed in a country constitutes a 
determinant of economic freedom which in turn affects the entrepreneurial level. 
 With regard to the dummy variables which were used to take into consideration the legal 
origin of the judicial systems, the estimation results advocate the impact of the legal origin on the 
efficiency of the justice system. The coefficients of the dummy variables indicate that the German, 
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French, Scandinavian and Socialist Legal Origin justice systems affect more positively the EC than 
the English Legal Origin system.  
 Finally, for the robustness of the estimation results, the R-squared is considered statistically 
significant at the 0,05 level for the given set of cross-sectional data and the F-statistic is significant 
as well. 
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6. Conclusion
The aim of this Master Thesis was to focus on entrepreneurship by empirically assessing  the impact 
of the judicial efficiency on it. Entrepreneurship is generally regarded as the workhorse of the 
economic development and growth. The creation of new business ventures, the development of the 
existing businesses as well as the creation of new job positions, which ultimately enhance 
employment, all contribute to and are necessary prerequisites for the achievement of economic 
development and growth. Under this thesis, entrepreneurship was examined from the aspect of the 
entrepreneurs’ expectations on the reliability of the judicial system which is assumed to relate 
positively to the efficiency of the national legal systems. With regard to the performance of the 
judiciary, emphasis is given particularly on the levels of contract enforcement given that the latter 
has been proved essential for business transactions and their eventual success or failure. So far, the 
literature on this topic has been very limited. Most studies focus mainly on the other determinants 
of entrepreneurship, such as the availability of and access to credit, the liquidity constraints, 
education, business and entrepreneurial culture, the existence of a stable and investment-friendly 
taxation regime, bankruptcy legislation and labor laws, neglecting the institutional aspect and its 
potential implications. This institutional aspect was investigated herein, especially with regard to 
courts’ performance which ultimately determine the reliability and consistency of the Judiciary.  
 The Thesis concentrated on a pool of 37 European countries and a cross-sectional analysis 
with data referring to 2012. Based on Ippoliti et al. (2014) paper titled “Judicial efficiency and 
entrepreneurs’ expectations on the reliability of the European legal systems” the empirical analysis 
performed herein purported to update the results by using more recent data from 2012 and to 
examine whether the relevant theory can be confirmed. Overall, the estimation results proved to be 
in line with the previous literature and the hypothesis raised herein that the performance of the 
judicial systems affect entrepreneurship. More specifically, it was found that the Enforcing 
Contracts - Distance to Frontier (EC) variable, employed to account for the entrepreneurs’ reliability 
on the enforcement of the contracts, increases when the Clearance Rate (CR) variable, employed to 
measure court performance, increases but with a decreasing rate. Furthermore, the EC is positively 
affected from the Civil Liberties (CL) variable which is consistent with the idea that more advanced 
legal systems exist in the countries where civil rights enjoy higher protection and that higher levels 
of contract enforcement are expected to be found in such advanced legal systems. In addition, the 
estimation results indicate an impact of the legal origin on the efficiency of the justice system. The 
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coefficients of the dummy variables indicate that the German, French, Scandinavian and Socialist 
Legal Origin justice systems affect more positively the EC than the English Legal Origin system 
which constitutes the base category. 
 To conclude, the findings of this empirical analysis update and verify the previous literature 
with regard to the impact of judicial efficiency on entrepreneurship. Moreover, given the 
importance of entrepreneurship for the economic development and growth as explained in detail 
herein, they further constitute an important consideration and guideline for future European policy 
contouring and the relative actions which might be taken with the aim to promote and foster the 
entrepreneurial activity. Within a reliable and efficient judicial system, more individuals are keen to 
take the risks to create new business ventures, hence the importance of the Judiciary should not be 
underestimated when contouring a policy framework aimed to enhance entrepreneurship. Finally, it 
should be noted that under this thesis, judicial efficiency is not claimed to be the only or the major 
institutional factor affecting entrepreneurship but it only aims to highlight the importance of the 
Judiciary along with a number of other institutional factors which should be taken into 
consideration as well.  
 27
References
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., and Zilibotti, F. (2003). Vertical integration and distance to frontier.  
 Journal of the European Economic Association 1, 630-638.  
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. A. (2005). Institutions as a fundamental cause of   
 long-run growth. Handbook of economic growth 1, 385-472. 
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., and Zilibotti, F. (2006). Distance to frontier, selection, and economic  
 growth. Journal of the European Economic Association, 4(1), 37-74.  
Acs, Z., (2006). Start-ups and entry barriers: small and medium sized firms population dynamics. 
 The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 194-224. 
  
Aidis, R. (2005). Institutional barriers to small- and medium-sized enterprise operations in  
 transition countries. Small Business Economics, 25(4), 305-317.  
Alesina, A., Ardagna, S., Nicoletti, G., and Schiantarelli, F. (2005). Regulation and investment.  
 Journal of the European Economic Association 3(4), 791-825. 
Anokhin, S., Schulze, W., (2009). Entrepreneurship, innovation and corruption. Journal of Business 
 Venturing 24 (5), 465-476. 
Armour, J., Cumming, D. (2008). Bankruptcy law and entrepreneurship. American Law and  
 Economics Review, V10(2), 303-350.  
Autio, E., Acs, Z. (2010). Intellectual property protection and the formation of entrepreneurial  
 growth aspirations. Strateg. Entrep. J. 4 (3), 234-251. 
Autio, E., (2011). High-Aspiration Entrepreneurship. The dynamics of entrepreneurship.  
 Oxford University Press, Oxford, 181-208.  
Ayyagari, M., Beck, T., and Demirgüç-Kunt, A. (2007). Small and medium enterprises across the 
 globe. Small Business Economics 29(4), 415-434.  
Bae, K. H., Goyal, V. K. (2003). Property rights protection and bank loan pricing. Mimeo, Korea  
 University, Seoul.  
Bae K., H., and V., K., Goyal (2009). Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Bank Loans. Journal of  
 Finance, 64(2), 823-860. 
Baumol, W.J. (1990). Entrepreneurship: productive, unproductive and destructive. J. Polit. Econ. 98 
 (5), 893-921.  
Baumol, W.J., Strom, R.J. (2007). Entrepreneurship and economic growth. Strateg. Entrep. J. 1,  
 233-237. 
 28
Berkowitz, D., J. Moenius and K. Pistor (2006). Trade, Law and Product Complexity. Review of  
 Economics and Statistics, 88(2), 363-373. 
Bertrand, Marianne and Francis Kramarz (2002). Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Cre-  
 ation? Evidence From The French Retail Industry. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117,  
 1369-1413. 
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Francesco Giavazzi (2003). Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation  
 and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118,  
 879-908. 
Braunerhjelm, P., Eklund, J. E. (2014). Taxes, tax administrative burdens and new firm formation.  
 Kyklos 67(1), 1-11.  
Braunerhjelm, P., Desai, S., and Eklund, E. J. (2015). Regulation, firm dynamics and   
 entrepreneurship. European Journal of Law and Economics 40, 1-11, DOI 10.1007/ 
 s10657-015-9498-8  
Ciccone, A., and Papaioannou, E. (2006). Red tape and delayed entry. CEPR DP 5996, CEPR,  
 London.  
Chemin, M. (2008). The impact of the judiciary on entrepreneurship: Evaluation of Pakistan’s 
 “Access to Justice Programme”. Journal of Public Economics 93, 114-125. 
Da Rin, M., Di Giacomo, and M., Sembenelli, A. (2011). Entrepreneurship, firm entry, and the  
 taxation of corporate income: Evidence from Europe. Journal of Public Economics 95,  
 1048-1066. 
Dau, L.A., Cuerzo-Cazurra, A. (2014). To formalize or not to formalize: entrepreneurship and pro-
 market institutions. Journal of Business Venturing 29, 668-686.  
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Laeven, L. and Levine, R. (2004). Regulations, market structure, institutions, 
 and the cost of financial intermediation. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36,  
 593-622.  
Diez-Martin, F., Blanco-Gonzalez, A., and Prado-Roman, C. (2016). Explaining nation-wide  
 differences in entrepreneurial activity: a legitimacy perspective. International   
 Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, forthcoming.  
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2002). The regulation of entry.  
 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(1), 1-37. 
Djankov, S., O. Hart, C. McLiesh and A. Shleifer (2008). Debt Enforcement around the World.  
 Journal of Political Economy 116(6), 1105-49. 
 29
Dougherty, M. S. (2014). Legal reform, contract enforcement and firm size in Mexico. OECD  
 Economics Department and Paris School of Economics. 
Dove, J. A. (2015). The effect of judicial independence on entrepreneurship in the US states.  
 Economic Systems, 9, 72-96. 
El-Namaki, M. S. S. (1988). Encouraging entrepreneurs in developing countries. Long Range  
 Planning, 21(4), 98-106.  
Esposito, G., Lanau, S., Pompe, S. (2014). Judicial System Reform in Italy - A Key to Growth. IMF 
 Working Paper, WP/14/32. 
Estrin, S., Korosteleva, J., and Mickiewicz, T. (2013). Which insitutions encourage entrepreneurial 
 growth aspirations? Journal of Business Venturing 28, 564-580. 
Foster, L., Haltiwanger, J., and Krizan, C. J. (1998). Aggregate productivity growth: Lessons from  
 microeconomic evidence. NBER WP 6803. 
Garcia-Posada, M., and Mora-Sanguinetti, S. J. (2014). Entrepreneurship and  enforcement  
 institutions: disaggregated evidence for Spain. European Journal of Law and Economics 40, 
 49-74, DOI 10.1007/s10657-014-9470-z  
Giacomelli, S., Menon, C. (2012). Firm Size and Judicial Efficiency in Italy: Evidence from the  
 Neighbour’s Tribunal. SPATIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH CENTRE (SERC)   
 DISCUSSION PAPER 108 
Glaeser, E. L., & Kerr, W. R. (2009). Local industrial conditions and entrepreneurship: How much 
 of the spatial distribution can we explain? Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 
 18(3), 623-663.  
Gordon, R. H. (1998). Can high personal tax rates encourage entrepreneurial activity? Staff Papers- 
 International Monetary Fund, 45(1), 49-80. 
Granovetter, M., 1985. Economic action and social structure. The problem of embeddedness. The 
 American Journal of Sociology 91(3), 481-510. 
Hessels, J., van Gelderen, M., Thurik, R., 2008. Entrepreneurial aspirations, motivations, and their 
 drivers. Small Business Economics 31(3), 323-339.  
 
Jappelli, T., Pagano, M., Bianco, M. (2002). Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement on 
 Credit Markets. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 37(2), 223-244. 
Johnson, S., McMillan, J., Woodruff, C. (2002). Courts and Relational Contracts. Journal of Law, 
 Economics and Organization, 18(1), 221-277. 
Laeven, L., Majnoni, G. (2005). Does judicial efficiency lower the cost of credit? Journal of  
 Banking & Finance 29, 1791-1812. 
 30
Laeven, L. and Woodruff, C. (2007). The quality of the legal system, firm ownership, and firm size. 
 The Review of Economics and Statistics 89(4), 601-614.  
Manolova, T. S., Eunni, R. V., Gyoshev, B. S. (2008). Institutional environments for   
 entrepreneurship: evidence from emerging economies in Eastern Europe. Entrepreneurship: 
 Theory and Practice 32(1), 203-218.  
McMullen, S. J., Bagby, R. D., Palich, E.L. (2008). Economic Freedom and the Motivation to  
 Engage in Entrepreneurial Action. Baylor University. 1042-2587 
Melitz, M. (2003). The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry  
 Productivity.  Econometrica  71(6), 1695-1725.  
Melitz, M. and Ottaviano, G. (2008). Market Size, Trade, and Productivity. Review of Economic  
 Studies 75, 295-316.  
Minniti, M., Lévesque, M., 2010. Entrepreneurial types and economic growth. Journal of Business 
 Venturing 25, 305-314. 
Nicoletti, G., Haffner, C., G., R., Nickell, S., et al. (2001a). European Integration, Liberalization, 
 and Labor Market Performance.  Welfare and Employment in United Europe, MIT Press.  
Nicoletti, G., Bassanini, A., et al., (2001b). Product and Labor Markets Interactions in OECD  
 Countries. Working Paper, No. 312, OECD, Paris.  
Nicoletti, G., Scarpetta, S., (2003). Regulation, Productivity, and Growth: OECD Evidence.  
 Economic Policy 18(36), 11-72.  
North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge:  
 Cambridge University Press.  
Novikov, I. (2014). How does institutional environment affect the internalization of small  
 enterprises? Procedia Economics and Finance 12, 489-497. 
Nunn, N. (2007). Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts and the Pattern of Trade. Quarterly 
 Journal of Economics, 569-600. 
Peng, M. W., Sun, S. L., Pinkham, B., Chen, H. (2009). The institution-based view as a third leg for 
 a strategy tripod. Academy of Management Perspectives 23(3), 63-81. 
Pissarides, Christopher A. (2001). Company Start-up Costs and Employment. Discussion Paper No. 
 520, London School of Economics.  
Schumpeter, J.A. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development. Harvard University Press,  
 Cambridge, MA.  
 31
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of  
 Management Review 20(3), 571.  
Veciana, J.M. (1999). Creación de Empresas como programa de investigación científica. Revista 
Europea de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa 8 (3), 11-36.  
Verheul, I., Wennekers, A.R.M., et al., (2002). An eclectic theory of entrepreneurship.   
 Entrepreneurship: Determinants and Policy in a European-US Comparison: 11-81. Kluwer 
 Academic Publishers, Boston/Dordrecht.  
Voigt, S. (2016). Determinants of judicial efficiency: a survey. European Journal of Law and  
 Economics, forthcoming. 
Williamson, O., 2000. New institutional economics. Journal of Economic Literature 38, 595-613. 
 32
